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Abstract 
The key structures of housing finance in the UK in the years leading up to the global financial 
crisis of 2007-09 consisted of retail deposits, secondary market funding and wholesale 
interbank lending. Although retail deposits were the major funder of UK mortgages, 
secondary market funding, which included covered bonds and residential mortgage-backed 
securities (RMBS), accounted for 31% of UK mortgage lending in 2006. In 2007, the collapse 
of the U.S. subprime mortgage market triggered a financial shock, and the shock quickly 
traveled beyond national borders. Regardless of differences in the UK mortgage market, 
investors’ concern over the prospects of the U.S. housing market influenced their perception 
of UK mortgage-backed assets. And with the UK RMBS market substantially reliant on 
overseas investors, their concern contributed to a downturn in the UK market.  
In a November 2008 report on mortgage finance by Sir James Crosby, it was argued that 
“[w]ithout intervention, the market in mortgage-backed securities won't return any time 
soon …” and that “the inability to refinance existing mortgage-backed funding and the 
continuing pressures in wholesale funding markets … [were] really hitting the banks’ 
capacity to make new loans …”. In response to this report, HM Treasury announced a £50 
billion guarantee scheme for asset-backed securities (the Scheme) on January 19, 2009 and 
launched this Scheme on April 22, 2009. 
The Scheme, in which HM Treasury provided a guarantee for eligible newly issued RMBS, 
represented an extension of the 2008 Credit Guarantee Scheme for unsecured debt issuance 
by UK incorporated banks and building societies. The Scheme aimed to support residential 
mortgage lending in the UK economy. The Scheme closed on December 31, 2009, without 
having been used.  
Keywords: United Kingdom, asset-backed securities, ABS, residential mortgage-backed 
securities, RMBS, securitization, guarantee  
 
 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to bank debt guarantee programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 





 At a Glance  
In 2007, the collapse of the U.S. subprime 
mortgage market triggered a financial shock, 
and the shock quickly traveled beyond national 
borders. U.S. investors’ concern over the 
prospects of the U.S. housing market influenced 
their perception of UK mortgage-backed assets. 
And with the UK RMBS market substantially 
reliant on overseas investors, the U.S. investors’ 
concern contributed to a downturn in the UK 
market. A November 2008 report on mortgage 
finance by Sir James Crosby (Crosby Report) 
stated that there was a “disappearance of a 
substantial section of the previous investor 
base” in mortgage-backed securities, draining 
liquidity from the RMBS market. Net lending 
secured on residential property totaled £37.4 
billion during January–September 2008, 
compared to £84.7 billion during January–
September 2007. The Crosby Report concluded 
that an “intervention which addresses the 
‘closure’ of mortgage-backed funding markets 
will bring about increased competition and 
improve the availability of mortgage finance to 
homeowners and would be homeowners,” and 
“such intervention should ensure that a cyclical 
correction in the housing market does not turn 
into something much more serious with all that would ultimately imply for the wider economy.”  
In response to the Crosby Report, HM Treasury announced on January 19, 2009, that the £50 billion 
Asset-backed Securities Guarantee Scheme (the Scheme) would be launched on April 22, 2009. The 
Scheme, under which HM Treasury provided a guarantee for eligible newly issued RMBS in exchange 
for a fee, represented an extension of the 2008 Credit Guarantee Scheme for unsecured debt issuance 
by UK incorporated banks and building societies. Under the Scheme, the maximum term of a 
guarantee was either up to three years or up to five years, and the participating institution’s group 
could not have more than one third of the total guaranteed eligible RMBS with a five-year term. 
Guarantees were originally to be provided only to eligible RMBS issued within six months of the 
commencement of the Scheme, but HM Treasury subsequently extended the issuance window up to 
December 31, 2009. The Scheme expired on December 31, 2009, having never been used.  
Summary Evaluation 
As noted, the Scheme was never used. Some commentators have criticized the effectiveness of the 
Scheme due to alleged design flaws including the exclusion of specialist lenders, restrictions on 
eligible securities, and the existence of other government programs with more favorable terms.  
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To support residential mortgage lending in 
the UK economy. 
Announcement Date  January 19, 2009 
Operational Date April 22, 2009 




Expiration Date  
Originally October 22, 
2009; extended until 
December 31, 2009 
Program Size £50 billion 
Usage  No usage 
Outcomes N/A 
Notable Features Specialized lenders 
excluded despite their 
importance to relevant 
market; terms less 
attractive than already 
existing program 
UK 2009 Asset-backed Securities 
Guarantee Scheme 
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United Kingdom Credit Guarantee Scheme:  United Kingdom Context 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in 
LCU converted to USD) 
$3,102.8 billion in 2007 
$2,948.0 billion in 2008 
Source: Bloomberg 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in 
LCU converted to USD) 
$50,567 in 2007 
$47,287 in 2008 
Source: Bloomberg 
Sovereign credit rating 
(5-year senior debt) 
 











Size of banking system 
 
$4,895.3 billion in total assets in 2007 
$5,299.6 billion in total assets in 2008 
Source: Bloomberg 
Size of banking system 
as a percentage of GDP 
157.8% in 2007 
179.8% in 2008 
Source: Bloomberg 
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Size of banking system 
as a percentage of 
financial system 
Data not available for 2007/2008  
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database 
5-bank concentration of 
banking system 
 
76.8% of total banking assets in 2007 
79.1% of total banking assets in 2008 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database 
Foreign involvement in 
banking system 
14% of total banking assets in 2007 
19% of total banking assets in 2008 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database 
Government ownership 
of banking system 
Data not available for 2007 
1% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
Source: Call et al. “Bank Ownership – Trends and 
Implications” 
Existence of deposit 
insurance 
100% insurance on deposits up to $4,000; 90% on 
next $66,000 in 2007 
100% insurance on deposits up to $93,000 after 
October 2008  
Source: World Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset, 
OECD  
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The key structures of housing finance in the UK in the years leading up to the global financial 
crisis of 2007-09 consisted of retail deposits, secondary market funding and wholesale 
interbank lending. Although retail deposits were the major funder of UK mortgages, 
secondary market funding, which included covered bonds and residential mortgage-backed 
securities (RMBS), accounted for 31% of UK mortgage lending in 2006. (Housing Finance 
Review 2008) Investors in the UK RMBS market were heavily from the U.S., as seen in Figure 
1. 





Source: Mortgage Finance: Interim Analysis, July 2008. 
In 2007, the collapse of the U.S. subprime mortgage market triggered a financial shock, and 
the shock quickly traveled beyond national borders. Compared to the U.S., the UK was 
reported to have fewer defaulting mortgage borrowers. Moreover, it was estimated that in 
the U.S., up to a quarter of all mortgage loans were subprime or near-prime, whereas in the 
UK market this percentage was much smaller. Additionally, most U.S. subprime lending was 
at heavily discounted initial rates and was “non-recourse lending,” incentivizing the 
mortgage borrowers to walk away from their debt once the equity in the property had been 
extinguished (Crosby Final 2008). 
Regardless of such differences in the UK mortgage market, U.S. investors’ concern over the 
prospects of the U.S. housing market influenced their perception of UK mortgage-backed 
assets. And with the UK RMBS market substantially reliant on overseas investors, the U.S. 
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investors’ concern contributed to a downturn in the UK market. A November 2008 report on 
mortgage finance by Sir James Crosby (Crosby Report) stated that there was a 
“disappearance of a substantial section of the previous investor base” in mortgage-backed 
securities, draining liquidity from the RMBS market. Net lending secured on residential 
property totaled £37.4 billion during January–September 2008, compared to £84.7 billion 
during January–September 2007 (Crosby Final 2008).  
The Crosby Report also argued that “[w]ithout intervention, the market in mortgage-backed 
securities won't return any time soon …” and that “the inability to refinance existing 
mortgage-backed funding and the continuing pressures in wholesale funding markets … 
[were] really hitting the banks’ capacity to make new loans …”. The Crosby Report concluded 
that an “intervention which addresses the ‘closure’ of mortgage-backed funding markets will 
bring about increased competition and improve the availability of mortgage finance to 
homeowners and would be homeowners” and “such intervention should ensure that a 
cyclical correction in the housing market does not turn into something much more serious 
with all that would ultimately imply for the wider economy.” In response to the Crosby 
Report, HM Treasury announced on January 19, 2009, that the £50 billion Asset-backed 
Securities Guarantee Scheme (the Scheme) would be launched on April 22, 2009 (HMT 
Statement 2009). 
Program Description 
The Scheme, under which HM Treasury provided a guarantee for eligible newly issued RMBS, 
represented an extension of the 2008 Credit Guarantee Scheme for unsecured debt issuance 
by UK incorporated banks and building societies (Market Notice 2009). 
The Scheme aimed to support residential mortgage lending in the UK economy. It intended 
to (i) improve banks’ and building societies’ access to wholesale funding markets, (ii) help 
support lending to credit-worthy borrowers, (iii) promote robust and sustainable markets 
over the long term, and (iv) protect the taxpayer by HM Treasury guaranteeing mortgage-
backed securities backed by UK residential properties (Market Notice 2009). 
Institutions eligible to participate in the Credit Guarantee Scheme were also eligible to 
participate in this Scheme and were required to use the pro forma application form available 
on the UK Debt Management Office website (Market Notice 2009). The institution would 
submit a request for participation to HM Treasury. HM Treasury, in its discretion, issued an 
ABS Scheme Institution Certificate confirming the participation. The participating institution 
then would apply for an ABS Transaction Confirmation for its proposed ABS transaction. 
Again, it was under HM Treasury’s discretion to confirm such application (Rule 2009).  
Eligible institutions included UK incorporated banks (including UK subsidiaries of foreign 
banks) which have a substantial business in the UK, and UK building societies, in each case 
so long as they had Tier 1 capital in an amount deemed appropriate by HM Treasury. Only 
one entity within a corporate group was allowed to participate in the Scheme, but issuances 
under the Scheme were allowed to be made either by the participating institution or by its 
sponsored affiliated entities (Issuer) (Market Notice 2009). 
There were two types of guarantee available under the Scheme. The first type was the credit 
guarantee, which ensured the timely payment of all amounts of interest and principal 
payable in respect of the eligible RMBS. The second type was the liquidity guarantee, which 
ensured that if an issuer failed to honor its obligation to purchase the eligible RMBS following 
an exercise of a put or call option under the terms of the eligible RMBS, then HM Treasury 
would purchase such RMBS from the holder. An eligible RMBS under the Scheme could only 
benefit from either a credit guarantee or a liquidity guarantee (Market Notice 2009).  
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Eligible RMBS under the Scheme were to be (i) issued under stand-alone transactions or 
under-established or newly established master trusts, which have been approved by HM 
Treasury at its sole discretion; (ii) denominated in a single currency; (iii) rated AAA or the 
equivalent at the time of issue by at least two international credit rating agencies, 
disregarding the availability of the applicable guarantee; and (iv) listed on the regulated 
market of the London, Irish, or Luxembourg Stock Exchanges (Market Notice 2009). 
Furthermore, any mortgages contained in the underlying mortgage pool of the eligible RMBS 
were required to meet certain requirements including minimum loan-to-value ratios and 
credit conditions (Market Notice 2009). 
Guarantees were originally to be provided only to eligible RMBS issued within six months of 
the commencement of the Scheme, but HM Treasury subsequently extended the period up 
to December 31, 2009. The maximum term of a guarantee was either up to three years or up 
to five years, and the participating institution’s group could not have more than one third of 
the total guaranteed eligible RMBS with a five-year term (Market Notice 2009). 
Issuers under the Scheme were required to provide periodic reports, at least quarterly, to 
the RMBS investors and HM Treasury. The disclosure in these periodic reports was to be in 
line with international best practice such as the “RMBS Issuer Principles for Transparency 
and Disclosure, Version 1,” published by the European Securitisation Forum in February 
2009 (Market Notice 2009). 
Under the Scheme, HM Treasury was entitled to be indemnified for the amounts paid under 
the guarantee from the participating institution or the Issuer. Moreover, it could, under its 
discretion, require indemnification from any member of the corporate group to which the 
Issuer belonged (Rule 2009). In addition, to participate in the Scheme, the participating 
institution had to pay a fee to HM Treasury in an amount equal to 25 basis points over its 
median five-year credit default swap (CDS) spread during the period from July 2, 2007, to 
July 1, 2008, as determined by HM Treasury, and HM Treasury could charge an incremental 
fee in respect of guarantees of non-sterling-denominated eligible RMBS (Market Notice 
2009).  
Outcomes 
There was no further extension of the issuance window for the Scheme, and it expired on 
December 31, 2009. A report by the National Audit Office on December 15, 2010 states that 
the Scheme was not used. 
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The British government introduced the Scheme as an extension of the Credit 
Guarantee Scheme adopted in October 2008. 
The Credit Guarantee Scheme itself was one component of a three-part package including a 
bank recapitalization program and the extension of a liquidity scheme.  
2. The Scheme was established pursuant to the authority of the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer to issue guarantees of debt.  
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This authority allowed for the establishment of the Scheme without the need for additional 
legislation.  
3. In accordance with State aid rules, the Scheme required European Commission 
approval to be implemented. 
UK authorities notified the European Commission of the Scheme on April 17, 2009, and 
received approval on April 21, 2009. 
4. The size of the program was established at £50 billion. 
Program documents did not provide a specific rationale for this amount.  
5. Institutions eligible for the Credit Guarantee Scheme were also eligible for this 
Scheme.  
Institutions eligible to participate in the Credit Guarantee Scheme were also eligible to 
participate in this Scheme and were required to use the pro forma application form available 
on the UK Debt Management Office website. When the British government introduced the 
Credit Guarantee Scheme as part of the October 8, 2008, package of stabilization measures, 
it made eight major institutions3 automatically eligible for participation “in recognition of 
their commitment to strengthen their aggregate capital position” by a collective £25 billion 
in Tier 1 capital pursuant to the Bank Recapitalisation Fund that was also part of the package. 
Other UK deposit-takers (including UK-incorporated subsidiaries of foreign institutions) and 
building societies could apply to be eligible, with eligibility contingent on a determination by 
HM Treasury that the applicant possessed sufficient Tier 1 capital. Applicants would also 
have their roles in the UK banking system and overall economy evaluated. 
The list of eligible institutions in the Scheme was narrower (limited to deposit takers and 
building societies) than recommended by the Crosby Report, which included not only banks 
and building societies but also specialist lenders (Crosby Final 2008; Rules 2009). 
Only one entity within a corporate group was allowed to participate in the Scheme, but 
issuances of RMBS under the Scheme could be made either by the participating institution 
or by its sponsored affiliated entities (Market Notice 2009). 
6. The securities eligible for guarantee under the Scheme were certain RMBS backed 
by residential mortgages over property in the UK.  
When the Scheme was first announced, eligible securities to be guaranteed under the Scheme 
were RMBS, but the UK government also stated that HM Treasury would keep the scope of 
the Scheme “under review.” However, there was no extension of the Scheme beyond RMBS 
(Market Notice 2009).  
Eligible RMBS under the Scheme were required to be: 
 
3 Abbey National, Barclays, HBOS, HSBC Bank, Lloyds TSB, Nationwide Building Society, Royal Bank of Scotland, 
and Standard Chartered. 
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• issued under a master trust existing at April 22, 2009, the aggregate principal amount 
of the proposed issue of Eligible Securities not exceeding the Capped Amount4; 
• denominated in a single currency of Sterling, Euro, US Dollars, Australian Dollars, 
Canadian Dollars, Swiss Francs, Yen, or such other currency as approved by HM 
Treasury;  
• rated AAA or the equivalent at the time of issue by at least two international credit 
rating agencies, disregarding the availability of the applicable guarantee; and  
• admitted to the official list of the relevant competent authority or stock exchange (as 
the case may be) and admitted to trading on the regulated market of the London, 
Dublin, or Luxembourg stock exchanges. (Rule 2009) 
Furthermore, any mortgages contained in the underlying mortgage pool of the eligible RMBS 
were required to meet additional requirements:  
• each mortgage loan must have been originated on or after January 1, 2008;  
• each mortgage loan must have been secured by a valid first-ranking mortgage, or (in 
Scotland) standard security, over a residential property located in the United 
Kingdom; 
• the current balance of each mortgage loan could not exceed £500,000; 
• LTV ratio of each mortgage at origination could not exceed 90% of the lower of the 
purchase price or the then most recent valuation of the mortgaged property;  
• the weighted average LTV ratio of all the mortgage loans in the underlying pool could 
not exceed 75% of the lower of the respective purchase prices of the mortgaged 
properties or the most recent valuations as at the time of origination;  
• at least one full payment in respect of each mortgage loan must have been made;  
• no amount of principal or interest in respect of each mortgage loan can have been in 
arrears at any time prior to the date of sale referred to above; and  
• each borrower of each mortgage loan:  
o must have been a natural person;  
o must have satisfied the lending criteria that would be applied by a reasonable 
and prudent mortgage lender;  
o must not have been a “self-certified” borrower (but this does not refer to “fast-
track” credit underwriting procedures); and  
 
4 “Capped Amount” means the aggregate principal amount of eligible securities which could be issued if they 
were backed exclusively by the Proposed Pool in a stand-alone transaction; “Proposed Pool” means the pool of 
eligible mortgages which is proposed to be sold by the eligible institution to the master trust to back the 
proposed issue of eligible securities. 
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o must not have had an adverse credit history. (Rule 2009)  
7. There were two types of guarantees—credit guarantees and liquidity guarantees—
available under the Scheme, and each issuance could only benefit from one type. 
There were two types of guarantees available under the Scheme. The first type was the credit 
guarantee, which ensured the timely payment of all amounts of interest and principal 
payable in respect of the eligible RMBS. The second type was the liquidity guarantee, which 
ensured that if an issuer failed to honor its obligation to purchase the eligible RMBS following 
an exercise of a put or call option under the terms of the eligible RMBS, then HM Treasury 
purchased such RMBS from the holder. An eligible RMBS under the Scheme could only 
benefit from either a credit guarantee or a liquidity guarantee (Market Notice 2009). 
8. RMBS with maturities up to three years (or five years in special circumstances) 
could be issued under the Scheme. 
A participating institution’s group could not have more than one third of the total guaranteed 
eligible RMBS with a five-year term. The government does not appear to have established 
minimum maturity requirements for eligible debt. 
9. Only RMBS issued in sterling, euros, U.S. dollars, Japanese yen, Australian dollars, 
Canadian dollars, or Swiss francs were eligible. 
Additional currencies could be made eligible via a determination by HM Treasury. 
10. There do not appear to have been caps on an individual institution’s participation 
in the Scheme.  
Program documents did not contain language limiting the amount of an individual 
institution’s participation in the program. 
11. The fee for issuing RMBS pursuant to the Scheme varied based on the soundness of 
the issuing bank.  
To participate in the Scheme, the participating institution had to pay a fee to HM Treasury in 
an amount equal to 25 basis points over its median five-year CDS spread during the period 
from July 2, 2007, to July 1, 2008, as determined by HM Treasury, and HM Treasury could 
charge an incremental fee in respect of guarantees of non-sterling denominated eligible 
RMBS (Market Notice 2009). This approach mirrored the fee structure for the Credit 
Guarantee Scheme, which imposed a fee of 50 basis points over the median five-year CDS 
spread.  
12. Issuers of RMBS guaranteed by the Scheme were required to produce periodic 
reports to their investors and HM Treasury. 
The disclosure in these periodic reports was to be in line with international best practice 
such as the “RMBS Issuer Principles for Transparency and Disclosure, Version 1” published 
by the European Securitisation Forum in February 2009 (Market Notice 2009).  
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13. The deadline for issuance under the Scheme was initially October 22, 2009, but 
was later extended to December 31, 2009. 
Guarantees were originally to be provided to eligible RMBS issued within six months from 
the start of the Scheme, subject to any extension at the discretion of HM Treasury. HM 
Treasury subsequently extended the issuance window of the Scheme up to December 31, 
2009 (EU 2009, Market Notice October 2009). 
III. Evaluation 
There do not appear to be any significant reports or studies analyzing the outcomes of the 
Scheme. However, a published report by the Communities and Local Government Committee 
(CLGC) contains a statement by John Heron of the Intermediary Mortgage Lenders 
Association criticizing the effectiveness of the Scheme in restarting mortgage lending. CLGC 
is a select committee of the House of Commons in the Parliament of the UK. Heron argues 
that the Scheme did not work from a mortgage lender’s standpoint because: 
• it could only be accessed by banks and building societies, which meant more specialist 
lenders—the lenders that typically support the private rental sector and have 
customers in greater financial difficulty—did not have access;  
• it only covered AAA-rated securities; and  
• the guarantee was only for three or five years’ term, and if a lender borrowed with a 
guarantee from the Scheme, it could be required to repay that money in three or five 
years’ time, which is not satisfactory for long-term funding of mortgages that may be 
20 or 25 years (CLGC 2009). 
Rob Thomas, a senior policy advisor at the Council of Mortgage Lenders, and Kevin Ingram, 
a partner at Clifford Chance, have questioned the effectiveness of the Scheme as it was only 
made available to deposit takers against the advice of the Crosby Report. Moreover, both 
Thomas and Ingram point out that these deposit takers already had access to the Credit 
Guarantee Scheme whose terms were more attractive than the Scheme’s (Thomas 2010; 
Ingram 2009). 
Ingram also criticized a certain design aspect of the Scheme, comparing it to Term Asset-
Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) in the U.S. Both were aimed at restarting the 
securitization market by encouraging investors to participate in the market. However, 
whereas TALF provided investors in eligible asset-backed securities resources to pay for 
their investments, the Scheme only focused on the guarantee side of the investments and the 
investors would still have to raise the funds to invest in the securitization market when such 
funding was hard to obtain in the first place (Ingram 2009). 
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https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/2009-10-
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V. Key Program Documents 
Summary of Program 
The Rules of the Scheme (04/22/2009) – Rules set forth on how the guarantee provided under 
the Scheme works. https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/2009-04-
22ABSRules%20(2).pdf. 
Market Notice: Extension of Entry Window for the Government’s Asset-backed Securities 
Guarantee Scheme (10/28/2009) – HMT announcement extending the period of the Scheme. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/2009-10-
28ABSMarketNotice.pdf. 
Market Notice: Outline of the UK Government’s 2009 Asset-backed Securities Guarantee 




•  Form of ABS Scheme Institution Certificate – HMT document certifying that the named 




Form of Application for ABS Transaction Confirmation – Form submitted to apply for 
participation in the Scheme (Annex 3). 
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Form of Application for ABS Eligibility Certificate – Form applying for certification of the ABS 
to be guaranteed under the Scheme (Annex 4). 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/2009-04-
22ABSRules%20(2).pdf. 
•  Form of ABS Transaction Confirmation – HMT providing confirmation that the named ABS 




•  Form of ABS Eligibility Certificate – HMT certifying that the named securities are guaranteed 




•  Form of Closing Certificate – Issuer of the eligible securities certifying that the transaction 
and issued securities comply with the rules set forth by HMT (Annex 9). 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/2009-04-
22ABSRules%20(2).pdf. 
•  Form of Eligible ABS Institution Counter-Indemnity in respect of [the Guaranteed Credit 
Liabilities][the Guaranteed Liquidity Liabilities] – Form provided to HMT by issuer setting 




•  Form Fee Letter – UK Debt Management Office’s letter providing the amount of the fee for 




•  Form of Offering Document Disclosure – Disclosure form to be attached to the offering 
circular of the issued securities stating that the issued securities were guaranteed by the 
Scheme (Annex 13). https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/2009-
04-22ABSRules%20(2).pdf. 
 
•  Relevant Guarantor Transaction Legal Opinions – Legal opinion confirming certain items of 




•  Form of Demand – Form to be used by appropriate party to demand payments under the 
guarantee from HMT (Annex 15). 
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Statement on financial intervention to support lending in the economy (HM Treasury, 






If securitization is Dead, why do so many government schemes use it? (Ingram 2009) – 
Article on the rationale behind the implementation of securitization in government schemes. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Capital%20Markets%20La
w%20Journal.pdf. 
The Role of Mortgage Securitisation in the Financial Crisis and how to Restore the Market's 




Housing and the Credit Crunch: Follow-up (07/07/2009) – Report by Communities and Local 
Government containing a statement criticizing the effectiveness of the Scheme. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/568.pdf.  
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